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Introduction
Family reunification – which for the purposes of this article means the process whereby
family members who are separated due to forced or voluntary migration regroup in a
country other than the country of origin of one or more of the family members – is treated
by scholars and immigrant advocates as a key element of the integration process and as
essential for migrants' wellbeing. The socio-political consequences of failure to facilitate
family reunification have been emphasised by the International Labour Organisation in the
following terms:
Prolonged separation and isolation lead to hardships and stress situations affecting
both the migrants and the families left behind and prevent them from leading a normal
life. The large numbers of migrant workers cut off from social relations and living on
the fringe of the receiving community create many well-known social and psychological
problems that, in turn, largely determine community attitudes towards migrant
workers.2
Despite the importance of family reunification as part of a humane and holistic immigration
policy, official policy relating to immigration and integration often ignores or seeks to
discourage family reunification,3 most likely due to the perception that more generous
family sponsorship provisions tend to raise the overall costs of integration and dilute the
economic benefits produced by the original labour entrants.4 The introduction of
administrative delays before legal status is granted to spouses, and integration conditions
whereby the family member must prove their integration potential before they have even
entered the state are amongst the legal tools used by European states to restrict family
reunification for certain types of migrants.5
In Ireland, family reunification has not to date formed an express part of immigration or
integration policy. In legal terms, the lack of emphasis on family reunification in Ireland is
reflected in the fact that outside of the field of refugee law, there is no legislative provision
for family reunification. Similarly, despite the strong protection of the family in the
Constitution, the jurisprudence of the Irish courts relating to family reunification has been
influenced by the difficulties involved in reconciling the conflicting interests at the centre of
family reunification disputes, as encapsulated in Fennelly J's words in the Supreme Court:
“The legitimate interest of the State in the control of immigration frequently conflicts with
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claims of migrants based on family reunification.”6
This article will examine the rules (including existing case law) governing family
reunification for Irish citizens; EU citizens exercising their right to free movement in
Ireland; refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection; and non-EEA nationals. While
the circumstances in which a deportation of a person already in the state can violate the
family rights of both the deportee and their family members remaining in the host country
has formed the basis of a considerable amount of case law and academic commentary,7
there have been very few cases considering the question of whether the State can be
compelled to admit family members in certain circumstances. Having examined the rules in
respect of each category, the article will assess the Irish family reunification regime in the
light of international law on family reunification. It concludes that while elements of the
Irish family reunification framework are influenced by international refugee law and the
ECHR, international law places relatively limited obligations on states in the sphere of
family reunification.
Differentiated rules for different categories of migrants
The legal position regarding family reunification depends on the legal classification of the
person concerned. Different rules apply to Irish citizens, nationals of EU member states,
refugees and other categories of non-EEA migrants who wish that their family members
join them in Ireland. EU migrants are in the most favourable position as regards family
reunification due to the right of residence of third country national family members of EU
citizens exercising their right to free movement as protected by EU law, followed by
refugees for whom family reunification is grounded in statute. In contrast, the family
reunification of Irish citizens and non-EEA citizens is based on ministerial discretion and is
consequently fraught with uncertainty for applicants. A cursory look at the rules relating to
each of the categories thus reveals an anomaly: EU citizens exercising their right to free
movement in Ireland, along with recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection, are better off in family reunification terms than Irish citizens.
The differentiated rules which will be explored in this article have a variety of rationales. In
the case of EU migrants, the rationale for the right to family reunification in EU law relates
to the objectives of the single market and the realisation of free movement of persons. In
the case of refugees, the entitlement to family reunification is linked to the inability of the
refugee to return to their country of origin. The rules in relation to these two categories are
both indirectly related to integration concerns in the sense of constituting an
acknowledgement that individuals find it difficult to settle and integrate in a country
without their family unit. The position in relation to Irish citizens and non-EU citizens, on
the other hand, is bound up with the concerns of immigration control and the desire to
maintain a high degree of executive control over the immigration and asylum systems.
The constraints placed on national family reunification regimes by the EU and international
frameworks are an important feature of the law in this area. Jastram and Newland note
that while family reunification across borders is shaped by the State's sovereign power to
control the entry of non-nationals, it is not entirely defined by this sovereign power. They
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argue that there has been a progressive development in the international law of family
reunification over the past fifty or so years such that it is now widely recognised that the
State has an obligation to reunite close family members who are unable to enjoy the right
to family unity elsewhere.8 This view is vindicated in this article which reveals that state
discretion in the sphere of family reunification in Ireland is being eroded, in particular by
domestic obligations under EU law, international refugee law and the European Convention
of Human Rights. This poses a significant challenge to the state-centred paradigm of family
reunification still perpetuated by the Irish government, and to a certain extent by the
courts. However, as mentioned above, it will also be seen that states still enjoy a wide
margin of appreciation as regards the domestic legal framework for family reunification,
except in the case of EU citizens.
EU citizens
Family members of EU citizens exercising their free movement rights in Ireland enjoy
derived rights under EU law regardless of their nationality. Third country national family
members of EU citizens (“TCNs”) who exercise their free movement rights are entitled to
essentially the same treatment as their EU national principal, with Directive 2004/58 (the
“Citizenship Directive”) comprehensively outlining these rights.9 The concept of EU
citizenship has also indirectly benefited non-EU national family members of EU citizens
falling outside the scope of the legislation, through the emphasis in the case law on the
fundamental rights of citizens and particularly the importance of the citizen's right to family
life.10 The law relating to family members of EU citizens constitutes a significant constraint
on national immigration law. For countries with integration conditions and tests for family
reunification for example, such conditions may not be applied in the case of TCNs reuniting
with their EU national family member who is exercising their free movement rights in that
country. In the case of Ireland, nationals of other Member States who have chosen to
exercise their right of free movement to come to Ireland and are seeking reunification with
TCN family members in Ireland are in a more favourable legal position than TCNs seeking
reunification with TCN family members, as well as Irish citizens resident in Ireland seeking
reunification with TCN family members.
This position has been reinforced in the wake of the ECJ ruling in Metock.11 In its decision
in Akrich the ECJ had introduced the “prior lawful residence” requirement, holding that a
TCN spouse “must be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to another
Member State to which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has migrated.”12 On the
basis of Akrich (and despite further rulings in Jia13 and Eind14 which rendered the
application of Akrich questionable) Ireland had introduced a prior lawful residence
requirement in its implementing legislation for the 2004 Directive,15 and this was the basis
for the Article 134 reference in Metock. The reference queried the legality of the prior
lawful residence requirement. The ECJ found (basing its decision on the Citizenship
Directive rather than general fundamental rights principles) that the provisions of the
Citizenship Directive applied to family members of Union citizens, irrespective of whether
they have previously resided in a Member State, lawfully or otherwise.16
The combined effect of the Citizenship Directive and the Metock decision has been that, in
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many EU Member States, EU citizens exercising free movement rights with TCN family
members are not merely legally assimilated to the position of a national citizen but are
actually placed in a better position in family reunification terms.17 In Ireland, the State has
continued to resist this loss of discretion over the entry and residence of TCN family
members of EU citizens. The courts have been obliged to apply EU law in decisions which
effectively have compelled changes to government policy and practice in this regard. In
John Tagni v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,18 Edwards J found that where
the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (the “Minister”) is uncertain about the
nature of an application but the applicant has provided all the required documentation, the
residence card must be granted within the six month period. This decision makes the
six-month time frame allowed under EU law for the Minister to decide a residency
application of a TCN family member of an EU citizen exercising their right to free
movement mandatory in all cases. Edwards J stated that the risk of fraud could be
appropriately dealt with by revoking the residence card after it is granted in cases of fraud.
On a procedural note, while the judge also stated that there was no time limit in respect of
reviews of decisions to refuse an application for a residence card, a period of consideration
of more than three months would generally constitute an unreasonable delay.
A further illustration of the extent of the restrictions placed by EU law on governmental
discretion in this sphere is the decision in Decsi v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform.19 In June 2010, the government introduced a policy to not allow the non-EU
citizen family members of EU citizens to work or set up a business while their application
for a residence card was being processed (which routinely takes six months). This was
successfully challenged in Decsi, in which Cooke J confirmed that the right of the family
member to take up employment, under Regulation 18(1) of the European Communities
(Freedom of Movement of Persons) (No 2) Regulations 2006 and 2008 (along with the
right of residence itself under Regulation 6(1)) was exercisable as of the date of the
acknowledgment notice issued by the Minister of receipt of a valid application for
residence. This was because the Citizenship Directive as implemented by the Regulations
directly confers the right to work or set up a business on family members of EU nationals
who have the right to reside in Ireland, as opposed to these rights being conferred by the
residence permit issued by the Irish Government. The practice of refusing the right to work
pending receipt of a residence card was in breach of Article 23 of the Citizenship Directive
which states:
irrespective of nationality, the family members of a Union citizen who have the right of
residence in a Member State shall be entitled to take up employment or
self-employment there.
This position, whereby neither the right of residence nor the entitlement to take up
employment is dependent upon or postponed to the issue of the residence card by the
national authority, effectively removes national control over this group of family
migrants.20
Much of the policy and practice discussed above has been justified as necessary to
counteract the spectre of “sham marriages,” whereby third country nationals enter into
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marriages with EU citizens in Ireland for the purposes of obtaining a residence permit.
These so-called sham marriages have been the focus of much media and public
attention.21 The most recent of these initiatives which purported to deal with sham
marriages was section 138 of the Immigration Residence and Protection Bill 2010, which
provides:
The Minister, in making his or her determination of any immigration matter, may
disregard a particular marriage as a factor bearing on that determination where the
Minister under this section deems or determines that marriage to be a marriage of
convenience.
Section 138(5) set out the factors which the Minister may take into account in reaching
such a decision, including, for example, the nature of the relationship between the parties
prior to the marriage and whether the parties are each familiar with the other's personal
details. This Bill failed to pass through the Houses of the Oireachtas before the dissolution
of the Dáil and thus will not become law. It therefore remains to be seen what approach to
this issues is taken by the next government. Legislation in this area has been made very
likely by the decision of Hogan J in the High Court in Izmailovic & Anor v Commissioner of
An Garda Siochana & Ors22 in which he clarified that, as the law stands, Gardaí have no
power to prevent non-EU citizens entering into a marriage of convenience for immigration
purposes, as the Gardaí have no free-standing power to object to a marriage under section
58 of the Civil Registration Act 2004. In fact, as the law stands, a marriage of convenience
is not an invalid marriage. While the Minister has the power under the 2006 Regulations to
refuse certain rights and entitlements to TCN spouses of EU citizens where it is shown that
they entered into a marriage of convenience, the law does not allow for a review of the
validity of the marriage before the marriage takes place.23 For this reason, the arrest and
detention of an Egyptian man in an effort to prevent his marriage to a Lithuanian woman
(which Gardaí suspected was a marriage of convenience) was deemed unlawful and the
release of the man was ordered. Hogan J stated:
I quite appreciate that the decision in this case may present the authorities with very
considerable difficulties in this problematic area…. As this decision in its own way
illustrates, the problems encountered here are difficult ones and present complex
questions of public policy in relation to marriage and immigration. These, however, are
ultimately policy questions which only the Oireachtas and, again if needs be, the Union
legislature can resolve.24
Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
Despite the fact that family reunification is not specifically provided for in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons,25 most states
provide for family reunification for refugees in their domestic asylum systems and, in
general, refugees are treated more generously in terms of family reunification than other
categories of migrants.26 In Ireland, family reunification for refugees is governed by
section 18 of the Refugee Act 1996, which provides that the Minister “shall” grant
permission to family members to enter and reside in the State if he is satisfied that they
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are a family member of the recognised refugee.27 “Family members” include spouses,
children under eighteen years and parents in the case of refugees less than eighteen
years.28 In addition, a second class of family reunification is created for “dependent family
members” (which may include a grandparent, parent, brother, sister, child, grandchild,
ward or guardian of the refugee who is dependent on the refugee or is suffering from a
mental or physical disability to such extent that it is not reasonable for him or her to
maintain himself or herself fully), who “may” be granted permission to enter and reside in
the State, at the discretion of the Minister.29 Individuals who are granted permission to
enter and reside in the State under section 18 are granted the same rights as those
extended to recognised refugees under section 3 of the 1996 Act.30
The existence of this statutory framework means that decision-making regarding the family
reunification of refugees, while resting with the Minister, is not completely discretionary, in
contrast to the situation for all other types of non-EEA migrants. This was confirmed in the
decision of Hedigan J in T v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,31 in which he
confirmed that the principles set out in Bode v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform (to the effect that in the case of special administrative schemes the Court would
not interfere with the discretion of the Minister) did not apply to the section 18 procedure
by which the Minister assesses an application for family reunification. In the instant case,
the delay of four years in considering the applicant's request for family reunification was a
breach of fair procedures. Unusually for an Irish judge, Hedigan J referred to the broader
international and regional context of Irish refugee law, stating:
The administrative IBC/05 scheme that was at issue in Bode cannot be compared to
the section 18 procedure by which the Minister assesses an application for family
reunification; the IBC/05 scheme was not placed on a statutory basis whereas the right
to family reunification is grounded not only in s.18 of the Refugee Act 1996 but also in
regional and international law and practice.32
Even more unusually in the context of refugee and immigration law adjudication, Hedigan J
emphasised both the constitutional importance of the protection of the family and the
centrality of family unity to integration, noting the linkage in Recital 4 of the Family
Reunification Directive between family reunification and integration. He opined:
The matter of family reunification is a matter of great urgency and importance. The
fundamental importance of the family unit and its right to be protected is enshrined at
the heart of the Irish Constitution. It is further protected by Article 16 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights,
among other domestic, regional and international instruments…. Thus, family
reunification is not only a way of bringing families back together but it is also essential
to facilitate the integration of third-country nationals into the State and into the EU.33
This approach contrasts sharply with the state-centred approach of the Courts to family
reunification for those without refugee status. In the case of refugees, the constitutional
imperative of protecting the moral institution of the family is invoked to give a greater
level of protection for family rights than in the case of other migrants (although the family
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reunification regime for refugees can be criticised on the basis of the failure to lay down
clear guidelines for the processing, investigation and determination of family reunification
applications).34 However it will be seen that this rationale is absent from the reasoning of
the courts in the case of families not comprised of refugees. The use of this approach in
the case of refugees seems to owe more therefore to the proliferation of international and
EU law affecting refugee rights, in addition to the existence of a domestic statutory
scheme, rather than the Irish constitutional position in respect of the family.35
Irish citizens
Irish citizens do not have an automatic right to be united with their non-citizen spouse,
children or parents in the State36 and the family reunification regime for Irish citizens is
based around the concept of ministerial discretion. A non-EEA national who wishes to
reside in the State on the basis of their marriage to an Irish national must make an
application for permission to remain in the State. The applicant will usually have to provide
evidence of the existence of a valid and genuine marriage and of joint residence. It is not
guaranteed that such an application will be successful and the Minister retains discretion
over all applications. In the case of married couples, the Minister is entitled to take into
account, for example, the length of time the applicants have resided together as a family
unit, as the approach of the Irish Courts has been that “a state is not bound to respect the
choice of residence made by married couples,”37 even where one of the couple is a citizen
of the State. In the case of Irish citizen children with non-citizen parents, the Supreme
Court in its seminal decision in AO and LO v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
found that the Minister was entitled to consider applications for residency of non-citizen
parents of Irish-born children on a case-by-case basis, balancing the individual rights in
question with the concerns of the State to protect the integrity of the immigration
system.38 While the facts of this case did not constitute a classic family reunification
situation whereby it is sought to admit family members who are outside the jurisdiction,
the decision illustrates the manner in which family rights may be outweighed by concerns
relating to the running of the immigration system.
The net effect of the discretionary regime in place in relation to the family reunification of
families containing Irish citizens is to place Irish citizens in a more disadvantageous
position than nationals of other EU states exercising their freedom of movement rights in
Ireland. While the rights of TCN members of EU workers are enforceable through the
courts via EU law, the family rights of Irish citizens and non-EEA nationals resident in
Ireland continue to be outweighed by a state discretion centred paradigm of immigration
control. In Costello's words:
In the absence of political voice, or EC judicial protection for the static EU Citizen, ‘exit’
to the transnational realm becomes the only option. Metock should thus prompt deeper
reflection on agency, belonging and identity in the EU. National governments' reflex is
to insist on discretionary control over TCN entry to the EU. In contrast, the ECJ's
rights-based approach supports a vision of residence rights in which origins and
belonging in the EU are decoupled, and blended families benefit from secure rights and
entry and residence along the model established for EU citizens themselves.39
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This model stands in stark contrast to the approach taken by the Irish Courts in both the
family reunification and the deportation cases, whereby the rights of members of “blended
families” comprised of both citizens and non-citizens gravitate towards the lowest common
denominator of the restricted rights of the non-citizen members of the family.
The legality of the differential treatment of Irish citizens and EU workers exercising their
free movement rights was confirmed by Edwards J in the High Court in M v Minister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, which involved a naturalised Irish citizen seeking
reunification in Ireland with her non-citizen mother.40 Edwards J disposed swiftly of the
applicant's argument that the legal position constituted reverse discrimination against Irish
citizens, finding that Irish citizens were not in an equivalent position to a non-Irish EU
worker exercising their free movement rights as Irish citizens do not have to exercise
rights under the Treaty or any Directive in order to work in the state. In these
circumstances, there could be no discrimination and the applicant had not established the
substantial grounds necessary for leave to seek judicial review. Moreover, he reasoned that
if the applicant were herself to exercise her free movement rights, she would be treated in
exactly the same way as any other EU national exercising those rights. Accordingly, if she
decided tomorrow morning to move to Spain or to France or to Sweden or to any other EU
country, she too would be entitled to have her non-EU national mother accompany her and
reside with her in that country. Furthermore, he found that in any case, EU law has always
recognised the principle of reverse discrimination, such that “Ireland is entitled to treat the
applicants less favourably than a national of another Member State who is in a position to
rely upon a specific Treaty right that the applicants are not in a position to avail of.”41
Other non-EEA migrants
Ireland exercised its right to opt out of Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification42 and
consequently the State is not bound by EU law in this regard. The overarching theme of
family reunification in the case of non-EEA migrants is ministerial discretion: there is no
legislation governing entry and rights of residence specifically for family members of
non-EEA migrants and the arrangements are of an administrative nature. It is open to a
non-EEA migrant to apply to the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service for anyone
(including a partner) to be allowed join them in Ireland, however there is no legal certainty
about whether such an application will be granted. Family members who are given
permission to enter and reside in the State are generally spouses and children under the
age of 18.43 Once family reunification is granted, the family members' right to remain in
Ireland depends on the sponsor's right to remain, although they may become entitled to a
right of residence in their own right, by obtaining a work permit or Green Card. This
dependence on the sponsor for legal status may put women in particular in a precarious
position and leave individuals vulnerable to domestic violence or abuse.44
While extensive discretion forms the basis of family reunification for non-EEA nationals,
specific policy approaches are taken in the relevant administrative arrangements for
different types of non-EEA migrants.45 Holders of work permits are generally permitted to
bring their family to live in Ireland after they have been legally working in the country for a
year, if they can show that they can support the relevant family members. Spouses and
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dependants aged less than 18 may apply for a spousal/dependant work permit once they
are legally resident in Ireland on the basis of being a spouse or dependant. Holders of
Green Card permits and Scientific Researchers are in a privileged position in that they may
bring their family to live with them in Ireland immediately, who may then obtain
spousal/dependant work permits. In the converse position are international students, the
general policy in relation to which is to refuse to allow family members to join them in
Ireland.
The potential for ministerial decisions regarding family reunification to be challenged by
way of judicial review is particularly limited in light of the approach of the Supreme Court
in Bode v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, where it was held that the Minister
did not have to consider the constitutional and human rights of an Irish citizen child when
processing an application by his or her parent under a specific administrative scheme.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that decisions of the Minister on family reunification
are in principle open to review. This was clarified in Khalimov v Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform,46 in which the court rejected the Minister's argument that his
power to grant or refuse entry visas for the purposes of family reunification was purely
discretionary and not reviewable. However, while the courts may review a ministerial
decision in this regard, it seems that in practice such a decision will very rarely be
overturned. The courts' perception of their role in the family reunification regime is clearly
illustrated in R&H v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.47 Here, a man who had
been granted leave to remain in Ireland for twelve months subsequently entered into an
arranged marriage in Sri Lanka and applied for his spouse to join him in Ireland, which
application was refused. Clark J in the High Court appeared to have little patience for the
application for judicial review of this decision, commenting:
There are some issues in this case which cause surprise. There was a presumption that
a person in the husband's position has a right to bring his spouse into the State. As the
application is based on a false premise the application is misconceived. It is for the
Minister to determine the conditions under which foreign nationals enter, remain and
leave the State
–this has been stated on many occasions by the Courts….It is clear that the
Minister is under no legal obligation to grant a visa
–the grant or refusal of visas is entirely within his discretion and it is for the
visa applicant to convince the Minister that he or she should be granted a visa.
Government policy determines which foreign nationals require visas to visit or
transit the State and whether they can work in the State.48
This passage reveals an extraordinarily state-centred conception of family reunification,
and one which appears to clash with the approach of the High Court in T v Minister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform as discussed above. However, the judgment in R&H v
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform is consistent with the reasoning of the Courts
generally in dealing with migrant or blended families whose legal position is subject to
ministerial discretion, whereby family rights may be treated as outweighed by
administrative concerns and the protection of the “common good” by way of the
preservation of the integrity of the asylum and immigration system. The approach of the
Delivery | Westlaw IE http://login.westlaw.ie/maf/wlie/app/delivery?&summary=true&docgu...
10 of 18 19/01/2015 16:38
Courts in these cases is encapsulated in the view of Hardiman J in delivering the judgment
of the Supreme Court in P, B & L -v- Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, where
he stated:
The state's obligation to protect with special care the institution of marriage and
protect it against attack cannot, in my view, be invoked to limit the Minister's
discretion in relation to an individual applicant whose application for asylum has been
refused.49
The important position of the family in the Irish constitutional order is therefore displaced
in the context of immigration issues by the concerns of migration control. The net effect of
these decisions is to render the scope for family reunification decisions to be successfully
challenged, on the basis of constitutional rights or otherwise, relatively limited. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
in which the majority held that the courts, when assessing the reasonableness of
administrative decisions in cases affecting fundamental rights, are entitled to consider the
proportionality of the decision may lead to a recalibration of the standard of judicial review
in these cases with a corresponding reduction in the scope of the discretion of the
Minister.50 It remains to be seen however whether this recalibration occurs and how
significant the impact of this is.51
Compatibility of the Irish family reunification framework with international law
The Irish courts have proceeded on the basis that family rights may not operate to limit
ministerial discretion and that there is no entitlement to family reunification for Irish
citizens or non-EU migrants other than recognised refugees. Is this consistent with
international law? The difficulties in relation to discerning a right to family reunification in
international law are summarised by Cynthia S Anderfuhren-Wayne as follows in assessing
the links between family reunification and the right to family unity as enshrined in
numerous international instruments:
On the one hand, family reunification calls for the movement of persons from one
State to another. On the other hand, outside of specific bilateral or multilateral
treaties, there is no right to immigrate and no general duty on the part of States to
allow persons to enter their territories. Although, practically speaking, family
reunification ‘should be considered as a means of implementing the principle of family
unity…,’ under general international law it is merely a policy the force of which is vague
and undefined — in effect, a right of unity without a clear means of executing it.52
Article 8 ECHR and family reunification
The ECHR forms part of Irish domestic law via its indirect incorporation at a
sub-constitutional level by the European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003. Unlike the
majority of national constitutions, the ECHR expressly applies to all persons on the
territory of State Parties and the rights contained therein therefore unquestionably extend
to immigrants.53 The ECHR has had a significant impact in the sphere of immigration law,
to the extent that DeBlacam has observed that “In the Irish experience to date, the ECHR
has had its most profound impact in claims initiated by immigrants.”54
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The typical family reunification case before the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)
has concerned the situation where an applicant in a Contracting State maintains that the
refusal of that State to allow the entry of a member of his family (most often a child) fails
to respect his right to family life. In conceptual terms, the distinguishing feature of these
cases is that they concern a positive obligation of the State rather than the negative
obligation at play in cases in which it is sought to resist deportation on the basis of family
ties in the host state. As the ECtHR has reiterated:
the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by
the public authorities. There may in addition be positive obligations inherent in
effective ‘respect’ for family life. However, the boundaries between the State's positive
and negative obligations under this provision (art. 8) do not lend themselves to precise
definition. The applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard
must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests
of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State
enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.55
This passage suggests that the principles to be applied in relation to the negative and
positive obligations contained in Article 8 are broadly similar. In the early family
reunification cases in particular, however, the ECtHR took a very restrictive approach
towards applicants making this type of claim, affording states a wide margin of
appreciation in determining whether a positive obligation existed at all. It stated in
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, the first of these cases:
as far as positive obligations are concerned, the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut:
having regard to the diversity of the practice followed and the situations obtaining in
the Contracting States, the notion's requirements will vary considerably from case to
case.56
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR shows that the State's right to control the entry of
non-nationals into its territory will rarely be out-weighed by the circumstances of the
individual applicants. First, the Court has been clear in its position that Article 8 does not
impose on a State “a general obligation to respect the choice by married couples of the
country of their matrimonial residence and to authorise family reunion in its territory.”57 In
assessing the circumstances of the applicants, the Court will consider whether admission is
the only way to develop true family life: are there insurmountable obstacles to setting up
family life in the country of origin? This is a high hurdle for applicants to overcome, as
illustrated by Gul v Switzerland58 and the subsequent case of Ahmut v The Netherlands.59
In the controversially harsh decision in Gul, the Court found that while the circumstances
of the family in question were compelling “very difficult from the human point of view,”60
there was no such obligation in this case as there were “strictly speaking, no obstacles
preventing them from developing family life in Turkey.”61 A similar approach was taken in
Ahmut v The Netherlands,62 in which the father had actually obtained Dutch nationality63
It seems that one circumstance in which the Court will find that insurmountable obstacles
exist to settling in the country of origin is where the applicant(s) have started a family in
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the host country and other children have been born or substantially brought up in that
country. Here the Court acknowledges that the State's decision effectively requires the
applicants to choose between their children in the host country and those in the country of
origin, compelling an impossible choice which does not respect the applicants' right to
family life.64 This formed the basis of the reasoning of the Court in Sen v The
Netherlands65 and Tuquabo-Tekle v The Netherlands,66 which seemed to signal a shift
towards a less restrictive attitude of the Court towards these cases.67 However, the limited
number of cases which make it past the admissibility stage illustrates how difficult it
remains to succeed in these cases.68
As noted above, the influence of the ECHR in Irish immigration judicial review cases is
pervasive. The Irish courts have been expressly considering the deportation cases in the
light of the ECtHR's jurisprudence under Article 8 since the AO and LO judgment,69 and are
required to do so since the indirect incorporation of the ECHR into Irish law by the
European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003. It is well-established that the Minister is
required to consider the Convention rights of the applicants in the context of his decision to
deport a parent of an Irish-born child under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999.70 The
Article 8 jurisprudence of the ECtHR is consistently referred to in the case law, and has in
this way infused constitutional decision-making in the sphere of immigration law. However,
there have been very few instances where the courts have been required to apply the
Article 8 case law in a family reunification as opposed to a deportation situation.
Despite the dearth of case law in this area, the approach of the High Court in Khalimov v
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform71 may give some indication of how the Irish
courts will approach these cases. The applicant was a national of Uzbekistan whose
mother, half sister and step father lived in Ireland pursuant to the Irish-Born Child 05
scheme. His sister was permitted to join them in 2009. The Minister had refused to grant
the applicant a visa to enter and live in the State and the applicant sought to judicially
review that decision. He challenged the legality of the decision on the basis of, amongst
other things, the failure of the Minister to consider his individual circumstances and his
right to respect for private and family life pursuant to Article 8 ECHR. Clark J found that
the applicant did not in fact enjoy any Article 8 rights in the circumstances as the requisite
family ties did not exist (the applicant was not a minor and was not dependent on his
parents) and in addition, Uzbekistan was not a Contracting Party to the ECHR - raising the
issue of the extra-territorial application of the ECHR. Although this effectively disposed of
the Article 8 point, Clark J went on to note that even if the ECHR did apply, Article 8 does
not guarantee the right to choose the most suitable place to family life, and that the Sen
decision meant that it was only where the family cannot be reunited elsewhere that states
are compelled to allow family reunification within their borders. It thus seems that the Irish
courts will take a narrow view of the State's family reunification obligations under Article 8
ECHR. Nonetheless, the implications of this judgment are that in the right circumstances,
Article 8 could apply, leaving the door open for its application in future family reunification
cases.
UN Human Rights Treaties
Delivery | Westlaw IE http://login.westlaw.ie/maf/wlie/app/delivery?&summary=true&docgu...
13 of 18 19/01/2015 16:38
The European Court of Human Rights has been slow to develop an extensive right to family
reunification in the positive sense of requiring states to admit family members of migrants
living in the state (although it has required states to do this on a number of occasions).
Similarly, while the right to freedom from interference with family life and the right to the
family are protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), there is no clear and unambiguous right to family reunification under that
instrument even though the right to family unity contained in Article 23 is a positive rather
than a negative right.72 In its General Comment on the position of aliens under the ICCPR
the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) noted that the Covenant does not recognise the
right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a state party - it is, in principle, a matter
for the state to decide who it admits to its territory. This key principle constitutes the
critical difficulty with any attempt to establish the existence of a right to family
reunification in international law. However, the General Comment stresses that, “in certain
circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry
or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of
inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise.” The Human Rights Committee has
also determined that states are under a duty to take measures to “ensure the unity or
reunification of [refugee] families.”73 In Hathaway's view, the question of when such
affirmative efforts are sufficient will likely be measured in relation to the usual
“reasonableness” standard meaning that conditioning family reunification on sponsor's
ability to support them, or public policy or security would be acceptable once it didn't stray
into the realm of the arbitrary.74 The provisions of the ICCPR relating to the family thus
represent a rather limited constraint on the general power of states to determine who may
enter and reside in their territory. In addition, as the ICCPR does not form part of domestic
law, it would be very difficult for an individual applicant to seek to rely on the ICCPR in
front of an Irish court. Nevertheless a refusal to permit family reunification could (in
circumstances where the decision is arbitrary and unreasonable) result in the state being in
breach of its international legal obligations under the ICCPR.
Family reunification is expressly referred to in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (“CMW”), although neither instrument provides an
unqualified “right” to family reunification.75 In its concluding comments on Ireland's state
report, the Committee for the Rights of the Child commented on the narrow scope of
family reunification entitlements in Irish immigration law:
The Committee notes that the Refugee Act of 1996 provides for an adequate legal
framework for family reunification. However, family reunification in accordance with
article 10 of the Convention also applies to other situations, including migration. The
Committee is concerned that family members seeking reunification do not have access
to procedural information, and that the principle of the best interests of the child is not
taken into account in the decision-making process.76
The Committee recommended inter alia that Ireland consider establishing a legal
framework for family reunification outside situations under the Refugee Act.77 It is a
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matter of some debate as to whether - under the CRC in particular - a right to family
reunification has begun to develop in international law.78 On this basis, the Irish system
relating to the family reunification of non-EEA family members could be incompatible with
the international framework. The intricacies of this debate are beyond the scope of this
article. From an Irish perspective however, it is sufficient to note that the practical impact
of the development of a “right” to family reunification under the CRC and the CMW is
limited. Ireland is not a party to the CMW, and the provisions of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child have not been incorporated into domestic law. Overall, in practical
terms the nebulous right to family reunification in international human rights law is likely
to make little impact on the Irish administrative regime on family reunification.
Conclusion
Significant change in the area of family reunification for non-EU migrants seems unlikely,
in the near future at least. The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 failed to
address family reunification and if and when legislation is passed to overhaul the
immigration system, Ireland may still be the only country in Europe without a legislative
regime for family reunification.79 In the meantime, the legal regime for family reunification
in Ireland remains characterised by a patchwork of differentiated rules and policies -
shaped partly by EU law, partly by international refugee law, and mainly by the principle of
executive discretion in the field of immigration law. While this discretion-centred paradigm
is undoubtedly placed under pressure by developments in the field of EU and international
law, meaningful development at the level of international law continues to be inhibited by
the principle on which this paradigm is based: the sovereign power of states to decide who
may be admitted to their territory.
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